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Abstract—Over the past few years, there has been a growth in 
activity, public knowledge, and awareness of cryptocurrencies 
and related blockchain technology. As the industry has grown, 
there has also been an increase in scams looking to steal 
unsuspecting individuals’ cryptocurrency. Many of the scams 
operate on visually similar but seemingly unconnected websites, 
advertised by malicious social media accounts, which either 
attempt an advance-fee scam or operate as phishing websites. 
This paper analyses public online and blockchain-based data to 
provide a deeper understanding of these cryptocurrency scams. 
The clustering technique DBSCAN is applied to the content of 
scam websites to discover a typology of advance-fee and 
phishing scams. It is found that the same entities are running 
multiple instances of similar scams, revealed by their online 
infrastructure and blockchain activity. The entities also 
manufacture public blockchain activity to create the appearance 
that their scams are genuine. Through source and destination of 
funds analysis, it is observed that victims usually send funds 
from fiat-accepting exchanges. The entities running these scams 
cash-out or launder their proceeds using a variety of avenues 
including exchanges, gambling sites, and mixers.     
Keywords—cryptocurrency, blockchain forensics, advance-fee 
scams, trust trading, phishing, Bitcoin, Ethereum. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The past few years have seen increasing awareness and 
participation in the blockchain and cryptocurrency industry, 
especially from previously unacquainted audiences. The total 
number of user accounts at cryptocurrency service providers 
was estimated to exceed 139 million in late 2018, with 
individuals (as opposed to businesses) still constituting the 
largest share of their customers [1]. Accompanying this 
increase in individuals holding, using, and speculating with 
cryptocurrencies, there has also been an increase in the 
number of malicious entities aiming to extract cryptocurrency 
funds (henceforth referred to as funds) from unsuspecting 
victims. Techniques employed by these entities include 
hacking exchanges or individuals [2], ransomware [3], and 
running Ponzi schemes [4].  
 One way entities may attempt to extract cryptocurrency 
funds from victims is through the use of scams. Thousands of 
seemingly isolated scam websites follow one of two general 
strategies: (1) The website attempts to convince a victim to 
transfer cryptocurrency to a blockchain address with the 
promise of returning more cryptocurrency. This structure is 
referred to widely as an advance-fee scam or, specific to the 
cryptocurrency ecosystem, a trust trading scam. (2) The 
website convinces a victim to provide existing credentials 
required to access their cryptocurrency with the promise of 
funds or access to a service. Phishing websites follow this 
 
1 https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/financial-scam 
second format; the victim believes they are on a legitimate 
website but are instead revealing their credentials to a 
malicious entity.  
 Unsuspecting victims are usually directed to these scam 
websites via links on social media. It is common to observe 
well-known individuals such as Elon Musk, John McAfee, 
and Vitalik Buterin on Twitter purportedly offering free 
cryptocurrency. However, on closer inspection, imposters run 
the accounts. One study tracked the evolution of over 15,000 
Twitter accounts set up to propagate such cryptocurrency 
scams [5]. The prevalence of submissions advertising these 
scams has led Twitter to release guidelines addressing 
financial scams in September 2019.1 
 This paper aims to provide an understanding of these 
specific cryptocurrency scams by addressing the following 
questions: (1) Can the plethora of isolated scam websites be 
broken down into distinct types? (2) Are scam websites 
standalone or part of more extensive connected campaigns 
operated by the same entity or entities? (3) Where are 
scammed funds being sent from? (4) Where are scammed 
funds being sent to?  
 To answer these questions, Open Source Intelligence 
(OSINT) tools are used to extract information about the scam 
websites. A clustering technique is first applied to the content 
of scam websites to group scams into different types. The 
same clustering technique is then applied to registration and 
ownership details of the websites to identify similarities in 
their ownership data. Further information about the funds 
received are analysed through blockchain analysis, which is 
made possible due to the transparent nature of the blockchains 
involved and would be unachievable if fiat currencies were the 
currency of choice for the scam websites.  
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: 
Section II reviews the background and relevant literature on 
cryptocurrency-specific scams and how they have been 
previously analysed through online and blockchain-based 
techniques. Section III explores the data sources used and the 
data extraction process. Section IV examines the DBSCAN 
clustering methodology used and details the considerations 
made while applying it. Section V presents the results of the 
clustering algorithm as well as the further analysis done. 
Section VI concludes with a discussion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section details illicit cryptocurrency activity within 
the broader context of illicit online activity, before 
considering tracing cryptocurrency-specific activity using 
blockchain analytics.   
A. Illicit online activity including cryptocurrency activity 
Illicit online activity, and more generally cybercrime, 
continuously evolves to take advantage of changing 
technologies [6]. Such activity can be split into three separate 
types [7]: 1) Traditional forms of crime conducted over the 
internet; 2) publication of illegal content distributed over the 
internet; 3) crimes unique to the internet, i.e. hacks and 
botnets.  
As with the advent of the internet, the advent of 
cryptocurrencies has provided opportunities for existing 
crimes to evolve and find a new platform, payment system or 
niche. These crimes form a small minority of the use of 
cryptocurrencies compared to the plethora of legitimate and 
positive impacts the technology can have (one estimate, on a 
subset of activity, is that 2% of cryptocurrency transactions 
are known to be illicit [8]).  
One example where existing illicit activity has 
transitioned to use cryptocurrencies is ransomware, which 
since adopting cryptocurrencies have seen increased revenue 
[6]. Another example would be Ponzi schemes, which exist 
outside cryptocurrencies, but have managed to raise large 
amounts using cryptocurrencies too; for example, a large 
cryptocurrency-based Ponzi scheme called PlusToken 
attracted over $2 billion of investment. The advance-fee 
scams focussed on in this work first originated in the 1970s, 
where they were originally distributed via letter or fax before 
increasing in prevalence due to the growth of the internet [9] 
and some now involve cryptocurrencies. Pump and dump 
events are another example as they are seen occasionally in 
traditional financial markets. The price of a cryptocurrency is 
increased by a coordinated and sudden increase in demand. 
Those orchestrating such schemes announce the certain 
cryptocurrency and participants buy with the hope that they 
can sell at a higher price [10]. Participants are usually made 
aware of such schemes through invite links, distributed on 
mass by automated social media accounts [11].  
As well as illicit activity involving existing 
cryptocurrencies, the increase in investment into Initial Coin 
Offerings (ICOs) seen in 2017 and 2018, provided some with 
the opportunity to invent their own cryptocurrency project, 
raise investment via existing cryptocurrency and not deliver 
on their promises [12], which could be considered similar to 
other non-cryptocurrency types of investment scams.  
One form of illicit activity that appears unique to 
cryptocurrencies and decentralised blockchain applications is 
the dissemination of deceptive smart contracts. For example, 
smart contracts have been implemented to appear like fair 
Ponzi or pyramid schemes, these claim to be trustworthy as 
participants can usually view and verify their immutable 
logic, however participants still commonly lose their money 
[13]. Another example is the creation and dissemination of 
honeypot smart contracts which appear to contain 
vulnerabilities, however any funds sent to the contract as an 
attempt to exploit them are retained due to hidden traps [14].  
 
2 CryptoScamDB.org was previously called EtherScamDB and 
is occasionally referenced in academic literature as such. It 
rebranded in 2019. It is run by the MyCrypto team for the 
benefit of the cryptocurrency community. The raw data that this 
B. Blockchain analysis of illicit cryptocurrency flows   
    Cryptocurrency addresses can be associated with illicit 
activity by extracting information about the addresses from 
online sources, including directly from illicit websites 
advertising the addresses or forum posts. For example, one 
study extracted addresses from posts pertaining to gambling, 
high-yield investment programs, and scam accusations on the 
cryptocurrency related forum bitcointalk.org [4]. Sometimes 
the original websites advertising cryptocurrency addresses 
may no longer be functional. In one such case, the Internet 
Archive is used to recover snapshots of Ponzi websites [15].  
    Given the public nature of the Bitcoin and Ethereum 
blockchains, once an address of interest has been identified, 
the magnitude of funds received can be examined [16]. In 
contexts where there are victims involved (for example, scams 
and ransomware), it is possible to estimate the number of 
suspected victims and the average amount lost by each victim 
[17]. Further analysis of the victim’s payments can be done, 
for example by analysing the time of day and day of the week 
payments are made [3, 18]. As well as analysing the activity 
of victims, similar analysis can be applied to the perpetrator’s 
activity. This is accomplished by examining outgoing 
transactions from an address of interest. Other schemes 
advertising addresses owned by the perpetrator can be 
searched for, as it has been found that addresses are reused 
between schemes [19]. New addresses may be generated for 
each victim, which makes it slightly harder to calculate the 
magnitude of all funds received immediately. Even when an 
entity is operating separate addresses, it is possible to group 
addresses suspected of being owned by the same entity 
through the use of rule-based heuristics [20] and machine 
learning [8]. It is also possible to track where funds are 
consolidated as funds in separate addresses may move to a 
single location; for example, consolidation addresses are used 
by ransomware operators [3]. The destination of where an 
entity sends its funds can also be examined. For example, 
previous work identified the types of services that funds 
predominantly flowing out of dark markets reached [21].  
III. DATA SOURCES 
This section outlines the sources of data, used later in the 
clustering and blockchain analysis.  
A. Cryptocurrency scam collection and website analysis  
An initial list of cryptocurrency scam websites is sourced 
from CryptoScamDB. 2  This is a public repository of 
cryptocurrency-related scam reports, which is chosen as the 
starting source of data for replicability. Most of the scam 
websites listed on CryptoScamDB are no longer functional. 
This limited lifespan is observed elsewhere for websites used 
for illicit purposes [22]. As the websites no longer exist, 
further information is sourced from a free service called 
URLScan.3 URLScan produces detailed snapshots of websites 
containing the website’s raw HTML and visible page content, 
IP address, and outbound links. For each scam, URLScan is 
queried programmatically to check whether a relevant 
historical snapshot exists from when the scam was active. The 
details of the 4,139 relevant snapshots found are saved for use 
in the clustering; the exact features used are discussed in the 
analysis uses is hosted on their GitHub, found here: 
bit.ly/38PButR  
3 URLScan.io  
methodology section (Section IV). URLScan also monitors 
and reports similar websites; 2,861 further scam websites are 
identified, bringing the total number of websites considered to 
7,000. Fig. 1 shows the reported geolocation of the considered 
websites, it should be stressed that this indicates the location 
of the hosting provider, or the content delivery network 
(CDN), rather than the location of the scam operators.  
Historical domain registration data, relating to who 
registered the domain name of the website, are also collected. 
It should be noted that the dataset does not include every low-
touch cryptocurrency scam website that exists, but is large 
enough to produce valuable findings.  
B. Blockchain analysis  
Blockchain addresses are extracted from the snapshots of 
the scam websites via regular expression pattern matching. 
18.1% of the websites have an extractable Bitcoin address 
advertised on their landing page and 38.7% of the websites 
have an extractable Ethereum address on their landing page. 
Each discovered address can potentially be associated with 
further addresses owned by the same entity using blockchain-
based heuristics; for example, the common-spend heuristic 
and change heuristic [20]. We refer to addresses associated 
together in such a manner as a blockchain cluster, as cluster is 
the industry standard name; this is not related to a DBSCAN 
cluster.  
Blockchain cluster information is sourced from Elliptic’s 
dataset, which is built by combining forensic analysis of 
different blockchains with a growing proprietary dataset of 
addresses associated with known entities4. This knowledge of 
entities is important for the source of funds and destination of 
funds analysis, because it is used to identify those who are 
sending cryptocurrency to and receiving cryptocurrency from 
scams. Rather than naming entities individually, they are 
grouped into broader categories (for example, cryptocurrency 
exchange, dark markets, etc.). Exchanges are partitioned into 
fiat-accepting exchanges, cryptocurrency exchanges, or 
decentralised exchanges. This distinction is made as fiat-
accepting exchanges are likely to have higher know your 
customer and anti-money laundering controls, whereas 
cryptocurrency exchanges and decentralised exchanges are 
likely to have more sophisticated users. 
Fig. 1. Country geolocation of recorded website IP addresses (sourced 
from URLScan.io) 
 
4 For those wishing to conduct similar analysis, Bitcoin 
addresses grouped by cluster can also be retrieved from the free 
tool provided by oxt.me which also has certain labels (i.e. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
This section outlines the chosen clustering technique, the 
considerations made while applying it, and details the exact 
features used.  
A. DBSCAN  
 The clustering algorithm chosen is DBSCAN [23], which, 
when applied to an n-dimensional dataset, identifies clusters 
as areas with a relatively higher density of data points. The 
DBSCAN algorithm is chosen because: (1) The number of 
clusters does not need to be specified a priori, which is the 
case in many other clustering algorithms; (2) the method does 
not require all points fall within clusters (data points in lower-
density areas are labelled as outliers). This is likely to 
represent the selected population well as individual websites 
may exist that are not part of larger types or campaigns.  
 For an area of points to be considered a cluster, data points 
must fall within an epsilon (Eps) search radius distance from 
one another, and the area must contain a minimum number of 
points (MinPts). Eps and MinPts are two parameters that can 
be set and affect the number of identified clusters and the 
similarity of the points within the cluster. A suitable Eps is 
chosen through the method presented and visualised by [24]; 
the radius to nearest neighbours (RNN) is calculated for each 
data point, these values are then sorted, plotted, and the value 
at the point of maximum curvature is chosen. MinPts is left as 
the default value (5); we do not consider configuring this value 
as we plan to focus on the larger clusters and not those near 
this lower threshold.   
B. Feature preprocessing for scam type clustering  
For clustering into scam types, we use the content of the 
scam websites. We generate our corpus from the URLScan 
content snapshots that provide the content already extracted 
from the raw HTML. Several pre-processing steps are applied 
to the content, including removing punctuation and stop words 
(for example, commonly used words such as “the”). Numbers 
are also removed, since it was determined that many of the 
scam websites use countdown timers and varying dates based 
on when the website is accessed (this causes arbitrary 
differences if included). Cryptocurrency addresses are also 
removed as they may be different even if two scams follow 
the same format. The standard TF-IDF algorithm [25] is then 
applied to get the final vectors for clustering. 
C. Feature preprocessing for campaign clustering  
For clustering into campaigns, a variety of registration 
details and ownership identifiers are used, and are selected 
because they have been shown in previous work as suitable 
for clustering illicit websites. The selected attributes, outlined 
below, have been used individually before, and achieved 
successful results when grouping websites in a non-
cryptocurrency specific context (for example [26, 27, 28]); 
this is the first known time they have been applied together 
and in the cryptocurrency domain.  
Google Analytics ID - Many website owners use third-party 
analytics services to better understand how their website is 
used. These analytics services often require a user account ID 
to be placed within the source code of each of the user’s 
websites they wish to monitor. Finding matching analytics 
known entities) associated with particular blockchain 
addresses/clusters. Labels associated with certain Ethereum 
addresses are available at etherscan.io.  
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service account IDs in the source code of seemingly unrelated 
websites indicate that they are reporting to the same analytics 
account. This has been shown recently as a way to cluster 
separate illicit websites into campaigns [26]. 17.7% of the 
websites in the dataset have a Google Analytics ID.  
Domain registrant details - As done elsewhere [27], the email 
address is decomposed into two parts: the account (for 
example, the part of an email address before the @ sign) and 
the provider. This is done as both parts can separately provide 
information; for example, one campaign could use a different 
newly registered email account for each of its separate 
websites, but all from the same provider. The country of 
residence provided by the domain registrant is also used.  
Domain registrar - This is the company via which domain 
names can be reserved and configured to map to IP addresses. 
A campaign being run by the same entity will likely exhibit 
patterns related to the use of registrars (e.g. repeatedly use the 
same registrar or switching between a couple of registrars 
[27]).  
IP address -  numerous separate domain names can be served 
content by the same IP address, and they are commonly used 
as a way to link illicit websites [28]. Using IP address as a 
feature allows investigation of whether the websites are being 
hosted from a single location or similar locations. The use of 
IP addresses as a feature within the clustering is likely to 
create higher confidence but smaller clusters.  
The above features, some of which are text-based, need to 
be transformed into a numerical representation before 
clustering. Label encoding is applied to transform categorical 
text into numerical values; however, it cannot be applied alone 
as the clustering algorithm may misunderstand the new 
numerical labels to be following a meaningful order. For 
example, if registrar ABC and registrar XYZ get assigned to 
label 1 and label 2 respectively, the newly introduced order of 
the two labels and also their closeness may be used 
erroneously without further pre-processing. To overcome this, 
One Hot Encoding is also applied. 
V. RESULTS 
This section first examines whether different scam types 
emerge when clustering based on their content. We then 
explore whether websites following the advance-fee format 
are part of the same organised campaigns. Once the scam 
websites have been clustered into types and separately into 
organised campaigns, blockchain forensics is used to analyse 
the proceeds they have raised, their evolution over time, and 
to find further connections between the websites. 
A. Clustering into types of scams  
When clustering based on the website’s content, 171 
clusters are identified, representing different types or variants 
of the scam websites. On average, there are 24 websites per 
cluster; however, some significantly larger clusters emerge, 
which are focussed on here. Table I shows the 10 scams types 
with the largest number of occurrences. The left-most column 
contains the cluster number assigned by DBSCAN.  
The largest type identified (type #25) contains 1,359 
advance-fee websites; each website of this type (shown in Fig. 
2) follows the same structure providing a payment address, 
QR code, and fake transaction logs purporting to be users 
successfully receiving funds. A relatively smaller type, type 
#39, is a modified version of type #25.  
TABLE I.  VARIANTS OF SCAMS IDENTIFIED 
# Description Members 
25 Celebrity/Exchange Giveaway (Advance-Fee) 1,359 
0 MyEtherWallet Clone - Pre-2019 redesign with pop-up (Phishing) 352 
1 MyEtherWallet - Unclear Format (Phishing) 173 
51 IDEX Clone (Phishing) 101 
5 MyEtherWallet Clone - Pre-2019 redesign without pop-up (Phishing) 80 
93 Coinbase Clone (Phishing) 63 
134 Exchange Giveaway - Bespoke Format (Advance-Fee) 60 
100 Exchange Giveaway – Blog Post (Advance-Fee) 59 
53 Celebrity Giveaway – Blog Post (Advance-Fee) 45 
39 Celebrity/Exchange Giveaway w/ Instructions (Advance-Fee) 37 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The typical structure of a type #25 website 
 Type #39 uses the structure of type #25 but also includes 
instructions on how much cryptocurrency to send at the top of 
the webpages. Both type #25 and type #39 embed the gif of a 
loading spinner into their pages via hotlinking; this is sourced 
from the same location, highlighting that the websites are 
using the same resources. The gif is hosted on a generic image 
hosting site, where the provided metrics report that it has been 
requested over 2,560,000 times, giving an estimate for the 
number of impressions received by these particular websites. 
We investigate whether other websites are embedding this gif, 
finding a possible 10,000 scam websites, and in the process 
demonstrating a new way to discover further instances of these 
scams. 
 Type #53 and type #100 contain websites that appear like 
blog posts and advertise advance-fee scams purportedly from 
celebrities and exchanges, respectively. Another observed 
advance-fee cluster is type #134, which is similar to type #25, 
but uses bespoke websites with the logo and branding 
associated with a range of targeted exchanges.  
 Several types represent phishing pages targeting 
MyEtherWallet, a popular Ethereum-based web wallet. The 
separation into different types represent different variants; for 
example, the 2018 MyEtherWallet site is replicated with a 
pop-up window (type #0) and without (type #5). Types 
replicating exchange websites in an attempt to steal their 
customers credentials, including Coinbase (type #93), are also 
present.  
B. Clustering into organised campaigns  
The campaign-based clustering is applied to the 1,560 
websites identified in the previous section as running different 
types of advance-fee scams (i.e. the websites classified as type 
#25, #39, #53, #100, #134). The campaign-based clustering 
identifies 25 campaigns due to similarities in the website’s 
ownership and registration features. On average, there are 17 
websites per campaign cluster, and some significantly larger 
clusters emerge. The largest campaign (campaign “K”) 
contains 69 websites, all appear to be served their content from 
within Moldova. All the known domain registrations occur in 
June, July, and August 2018. The domain names, a factor that 
was not used to produce the clustering, all explicitly mention 
“ethereum” or “eth.” Fifty-one of the websites are served from 
the same IP address, and 18 from another similar IP address. 
All the websites are the advance-fee type #25.  
The second-largest campaign (campaign “N”) contains 43 
websites. This campaign’s content appears to be served from 
IP addresses within Russia. It has domains registered over 
dates spanning 2018 and 2019. A variety of domain styles 
exist, including domains targeting Ethereum, Elon Musk, and 
Tesla. Many of the domains registered in this campaign are 
associated with the same registrant email address, likely to be 
a throwaway account. The websites are also all hosted from 
within the same IP subnet. Different scam types are being run 
from this campaign, including the Celebrity/Exchange 
Giveaway scam (type #25), the Exchange Giveaway - Bespoke 
Format scam (type #134), and the Exchange Giveaway - Blog 
Post scam (type #100).  
 Across all the campaigns, it is found that 29% of the 
identified campaigns are running more than one type of 
advance-fee scam. This shows that the same entities are 
running the different types of advance-fee scams and are 
diversifying their reach. The majority of identified campaigns, 
54%, are served solely from IP addresses that appear to be 
within US. It is found that 25% of the identified campaigns 
have two or more occurrences of matching Google Analytics 
IDs.   
 It should be noted that these different campaigns are likely 
to represent changing styles of operation by the same entity. 
We hypothesise that single entities operate multiple of these 
campaigns; when they are separated into multiple campaigns, 
it is because there has been a change in operation practices (for 
example, using a different set of IP addresses or a change of 
domain registrar).   
C. Analysis of the advance-fee type behaviour  
Fig. 3 shows the date of domain registrations and the dates 
and magnitudes of Bitcoin and Ether inflows (Ether is the 
name of the main cryptocurrency on the Ethereum blockchain) 
for the five largest advance-fee types identified. The 
Celebrity/Exchange Giveaway type is active throughout the 
data period considered, highlighting the continued 
effectiveness of the type and suggesting that it has operated 
with impunity. The long lifetime and intensity of domain 
registrations result in it receiving more incoming transactions 
than the other types combined. Although it received more 
transactions, the average USD value of transactions for this 
type (and the other celebrity-related types) is lower than for 
the types only targeting exchanges. There was a temporary 
reduction in the Celebrity/Exchange Giveaway domain 
registrations and cryptocurrency inflows between January 
2019 and April 2019. The lull in activity is more pronounced 
for this type due to the higher frequency of its activity at other 
times, but is also seen to an extent in the Celebrity Giveaway 
– Blog Post and the Exchange Giveaway - Blog Post types. 
The appearance of the Exchange Giveaway - Bespoke Format 
type late in the dataset highlights it is a more recent threat. Its 
appearance may also demonstrate that the scams are evolving 
as this bespoke format appears slightly more complex and 
convincing than the standard Celebrity/Exchange Giveaway 
type.   
 The inflows of cryptocurrency occur around (usually after) 
domain registrations. To better visualise the relationship 
between domain registrations and particular incoming 
payments, Fig. 4 shows the number of days between a 
domain’s registration date and incoming payments to 
cryptocurrency addresses advertised by that domain, for all 
scam types. It can be seen that 55.4% of incoming 
cryptocurrency transfers occur within the first week after 
domain registration, 71.8% of payments occur within the first 
two weeks and 91.1% of payments occur within the first 30 
days. The finding that the majority of payments are received 
shortly after a domain registration, indicating each domain is 
active for a short time, aligns with other work which found the 
lifetime of domains registered for illicit activity is short [22]. 
The limited lifetime of each domain name also explains the 
high frequency at which the domains are registered (rather 
than just one being registered and used throughout the entire 
duration of a type’s life).
 
Fig. 3. Domain registrations (marked as “x”), inflows of Ether (blue, above associated domain registrations) and inflows of Bitcoin (orange, below 
associated domain registrations), over time for the five largest advance-fee types; the size of a bubble represents magnitude in USD. Inflows to addresses 
associated with multiple scam types are removed to isolate flows to different types. 
 
Date 
 Fig. 4. Emperical Cumulative Distribution Function (ECDF) of the 
number of days since domain registration that incoming payments to 
associated cryptocurrency addresses are received on (where available); 
incoming payments prior to domain registration are excluded. 
 It should be noted that in some cases addresses receive 
incoming payments before any recorded domain registrations. 
There are several possible reasons for this, including that: 1) 
The address is being used by the scammer before being used 
for the scam; 2) The address is being used as part of another 
scam type not considered in this work; 3) The address is being 
used as part of one of the considered scam types, but not 
captured in the data collection process. Address reuse between 
different scam types, including in the case of the Exchange 
Giveaway - Bespoke Format type, is considered later in 
Section V(D).   
 At the start of the data period considered in Fig. 3, the 
majority of inflows are Ether-based (blue-shaded bubbles), 
whereas over time, the inflows change to being Bitcoin-based 
(orange-shaded bubbles). It should be noted some Ether 
inflows still exist throughout the data period, but their 
magnitudes are smaller than Bitcoin inflows towards the end 
of the period considered. We hypothesise that the decreasing 
value of Ether inflows could be a result of the declining Ether 
price, both in USD and relative to Bitcoin (ETH/BTC), over 
the time period considered. Generally, the scam websites state 
the amount to send in units of their target cryptocurrency, and 
so unchanged units of Ether translate to lower USD values.  
The longevity of the Celebrity/Exchange Giveaway type 
provides an opportunity to analyse, for an individual type, how 
the style of domain registrations changes over time. This 
provides an insight into the changing tactics of the scams. 
Near the start of the dataset collected (March 2018 to July 
2018), 87% of domain registrations included the word “eth” 
or “ethereum,” whereas towards the end of the dataset 
collected (May 2019 to September 2019) the percentage is 
44%. Over time there is an increase in domain names that: 1) 
are not specific to one cryptocurrency; 2) relate to particular 
legitimate cryptocurrency-related events; 3) target celebrities 
and companies outside of the cryptocurrency ecosystem. The 
observed proportional reduction in Ethereum-related domain 
names aligns with the aforementioned reduction in Ether 
inflows over time. We hypothesise that these scam types 
transitioned to targeting/receiving Bitcoin rather than Ether 
potentially due to several factors, including that the scammers 
aimed to broaden their audience, or more likely, they were 
following market trends (e.g. the weakening of the ETH/BTC 
price, mentioned above). 
 
D. Re-use of blockchain addresses and blockchain clusters 
 
 In preparation for the below analysis, addresses that were 
part of blockchain clusters that are known to be, or exhibit the 
characteristics of, large cryptocurrency custodial services are 
removed; such characteristics include abnormally large 
transaction volumes or received amount. The removal of these 
clusters is done at this stage because identifying two scam 
websites attempting to receive payments to two different 
addresses issued by the same custodial service (for example, 
trading exchange) does not indicate that the scams are 
operated by the same entity; if custodial services were kept, 
the analysis to follow would group unconnected entities 
together because they have chosen to use the same custodial 
service (i.e. their addresses fall within the same large 
blockchain cluster). Under 5% of addresses were removed. 
Most scams would not operate using addresses hosted by such 
services as they are at risk of the service seizing their funds. 
Most of the remaining bitcoin clusters are small; 50% of the 
clusters contain two or under addresses, 75% of the clusters 
contain eight or below addresses, and 90% of the clusters 
contain below twenty-five addresses.  
 We first consider whether multiple scam types are 
receiving funds to addresses in the same blockchain cluster. 
No blockchain cluster reuse between scam types would result 
in a similarity of 0%. We find that 15.4% of blockchain 
clusters associated with Exchange Giveaway - Blog Post 
scams are associated with two or more websites advertising 
such scams; similar, but lower levels of reuse are found for the 
other scam types. We also find that scams of different types 
are attempting to receive funds to the same blockchain cluster. 
For example,  Exchange Giveaway - Blog Post and the 
Exchange Giveaway - Bespoke Format types share 1.6% of 
their used blockchain clusters which provides further evidence 
that the same entities are running different types of the 
advance-fee scam, similar to the finding that the same IP 
addresses were running the different types of the scam.  
 We investigate the previous hypothesis that specific 
campaigns may appear separate because of different online 
characteristics (for example, hosting, domain registrar, etc.), 
but are operated by the same entity. To do this, we consider 
whether the ownership campaigns identified in Section V(B) 
use any blockchain addresses which can be linked to the same 
owner. Fig. 5 shows the individual campaigns as nodes, 
including campaign “K” and “N” analysed previously, and 
edges where there is an overlap in certain campaigns’ 
associated blockchain cluster. Campaigns A, B, C, D, G, H, 
O, and Y form a connected component representing that their 
addresses are in the same blockchain cluster, meaning the 
same owner is receiving funds from these campaigns. 
 
Fig. 5. Blockchain cluster overlap between different campaigns  
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 The ownership information of these campaigns shows 
several different online infrastructure setups being used by 
what has now been discovered to be the same controlling 
entity. This finding shows the same entities are running 
multiple campaigns using different operational practices and 
demonstrates the added value of blockchain analysis over 
merely trying to extract web-based information. Any of the 
other identified campaigns may be run by the same entity, but 
their blockchain activity does not provide conclusive 
evidence.  
It is observed that cryptocurrency occasionally moves 
between addresses and blockchain clusters associated with 
different scam campaigns. This prompts further investigation 
into incoming and outgoing flows through exploring the 
source and destination of funds.  
E. Source of funds 
This section investigates where funds are being sent from 
before arriving in addresses associated with all the scams 
collected during this work. To do this, we trace back 
transactions until they reach a known entity. Table II shows 
that over 94% of funds received by these scams come from 
one of the different types of exchanges (either from a fiat-
accepting exchange, cryptocurrency exchange, or 
decentralised exchange).  
The next largest source of funds, contributing 2.92%, is 
from addresses associated with other scams. This initially 
seems counter-intuitive as the operator of one scam is unlikely 
to fall for another. Visual inspection of such examples shows 
blockchain activity manufactured to give the perception of a 
genuine system. A scammer will send their new scam address 
X amount and will return Y, in order to appear as if their 
claims are genuine in an attempt to lure payments in from 
others.  
Fig. 6 shows the geographical location of the exchange’s 
that funds are flowing from, which may provide some 
indication of the geographical region of victims.5 Most funds 
that are received from exchanges come from those based in 
the U.S., formerly China,6  and South Korea. We note that 
funds from U.S. and Chinese exchanges flowed to both 
Bitcoin and Ether based scams, whereas funds from South 
Korean exchanges primarily went to Ether based scams.  
TABLE II.  SOURCE OF FUNDS CATEGORIES  
Category USD received by scams 
% of total USD  
received by scams 
Fiat-Accepting Exchange 2,476,100  79.32 
Cryptocurrency Exchange 450,300  14.43 
Scam 90,900  2.91 
Miner 37,800  1.21 
Wallet Service 25,500  0.82 
Payment Service Provider 11,300  0.36 
Decentralised Exchange 9,300  0.3 
Gambling 9,200  0.29 
Ponzi Scheme 3,100  0.1 
Dark Market  2,700  0.09 
Other 5,300  0.17 
 
5 It should be noted this does not use the location of victims 
being scammed, but rather the registered location of the whole 
exchange. It is only used as an indication, as exchanges usually 
serve multiple jurisdictions.  
TABLE III.  DESTINATION OF FUNDS CATEGORIES 
Category USD sent by scams 
% of total USD sent 
by scams 
Fiat-Accepting Exchange 1,144,900  56.68 
Gambling 246,600  12.21 
Scam 238,900  11.83 
Cryptocurrency Exchange 204,300  10.11 
Mixer 54,400  2.69 
Payment Service Provider 44,300  2.19 
Dark Market  24,900  1.23 
Phishing 18,500  0.92 
Decentralised Exchange 15,400  0.76 
Miner 11,300  0.56 
Other 16,500  0.82 
F. Destination of funds 
 Table III shows the destination of funds once leaving 
addresses associated with the scams. Over 67% of the funds 
are received by exchanges. Similar preference to send 
onwards towards exchanges, potentially for immediate cash-
out, was seen in previous work while examining illicit flows 
from dark markets [21]. The destinations can broadly be split 
into three types of activities: 1) Cashing-out through fiat or by 
making a purchase, 2) sending funds onwards for another use, 
or 3)  mixing them to obfuscate their final destination. 
Exchanges and gambling services fall under the first activity 
where the scammer is likely attempting to exchange their 
funds for fiat. The act of sending funds onto dark markets and 
payment service providers indicates that the scammers intend 
to make illegitimate or legitimate purchases, respectively.  
 Fig. 6 shows that exchanges based in the U.S. receive the 
most funds. The majority of funds flowing to U.S.-based 
exchanges go to two exchanges, potentially because of their 
lack of blockchain transaction screening. Exchanges in 
Finland received 17.5% of funds, while they were not a 
significant source of funds, suggesting those cashing out illicit 
funds are actively choosing exchanges there. Funds flowing to 
Finland primarily go to one peer-to-peer fiat-exchange. 
Fig. 6. Country based source and destination of exchange funds 
6 Many exchanges originated in China before moving to a range 
of locations due to preventative regulatory actions within the 
country.  “Formerly China” is used to refer to these exchanges.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 This work provides the first known academic analysis of 
advance-fee cryptocurrency scams, commonly advertised on 
social media. Five distinct types of advance-fee scams were 
found to be used by over 1,000 websites. It was shown that 
seemingly separate websites are being run under the same 
organised campaigns, found through clustering based on their 
hosting and registration features. The features used in the 
DBSCAN clustering could also be applied to group non-
cryptocurrency specific scam websites, however the ability to 
easily analyse the proceeds raised and easily find further links 
between campaigns is unique to cryptocurrency-specific scam 
websites due to the transparent nature of the blockchains used. 
For example, blockchain analysis linked certain scam 
websites that appeared initially to be associated with different 
campaigns to be owned by the same entity (i.e. within the 
same blockchain cluster) demonstrating that multiple 
campaigns are run by the same entity using different styles of 
operation/online infrastructure setups.  
 Fiat-accepting exchanges are both the largest source of 
funds and the largest destination of funds. Exchanges may 
want to be vigilant that scams target their users, but also that 
scammers attempt to cash out the stolen cryptocurrency 
through their services. It was also found that scammers are 
moving cryptocurrency between separate scams, seemingly to 
generate perceived activity; similar manufactured activity is 
generated around other illicit blockchain schemes (for 
example, in smart contract honeypots [14]). The perpetrators 
utilise the uniquely transparent nature of blockchain 
transactions to lure victims into believing the scheme is 
genuine.      
 At the time of writing, a new type of advance-fee scam has 
recently come into existence. This new type reuploads videos 
of legitimate presentations. The sound is sometimes muted, 
and details of a fictitious giveaway are superimposed over or 
around the original presentation slides to make it appear that 
the legitimate speaker is doing a cryptocurrency giveaway; 
there is the usual requirement that a small amount of 
cryptocurrency is sent by the victim upfront. This new type of 
advance-fee scam gives a timely reminder that such scams are 
still active and that they continue to evolve and advance. 
 It is hoped the work here will prompt further research into 
the operation of these low-touch cryptocurrency scams, as 
further understanding of their operation, including automated 
identification techniques and prevention, will help for the 
betterment of the cryptocurrency industry.  
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